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Abstract 
This paper analyses the implementation of a French public AIDS prevention policy through campaigns 
targeting the general population. More precisely, it is aimed at understanding how the political 
authorities dealt with the emergence of an epidemic through mass media campaigns. First, I argue that 
activist organizations a leading role on the implementation of that policy. Second, I contend that 
political uncertainties and destabilization paved the way for organizations to lead the debates and 
impose their framing. This political situation was enabled by two main factors: the HIV-tainted blood 
scandal and the political instability generated by the successive political “cohabitations” in which a 
left-wing president coexisted with a right-wing parliament, prime minister and prime minister’s 
appointed officials. The actors and arenas are presented and the process of political action is analysed. 
Then three noteworthy stages of state-run communication are discussed. They represent major steps in 
the evolution of the political agenda marked by the influence of activist organizations. 
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Introduction 
Regarding infectious diseases, Western countries had regulatory traditions that were not applied to 
AIDS (Robins and Backstrom, 1991). As in other Western countries1, early French AIDS policy 
withstood the pressures to impose repressive measures (Steffen, 1992) This stance was supported by 
AIDS organizations. The gay activists, who fought in the 1970s for their rights, had the leadership 
over these organizations, as observed in the USA (Kirp, 1999). Active in France during the 1970s 
(Adam, 1999), the movement for the gay rights weakened in the early 80s as the new socialist 
president François Mitterrand fulfilled his pledge to suppress discriminatory laws. But it strengthened 
again with the spread of AIDS epidemic. 
A constant aim of the AIDS policy has been the maintenance of social balance and the avoidance of 
reactions such as panic, rumours, or social stigmatisation, as the atmosphere prior to the launching of 
the first AIDS campaign was dominated in the press by apocalyptic visions (Herzlich and Pierret, 
1989). Good prevention of AIDS could only be promoted if people were convinced they were facing a 
controllable danger and if the persons with AIDS (PWA), more fragile because of their marginal 
situation, did not have to cope both with the illness and social hostility. Concealing their illness would 
make them unable to adopt the appropriate preventive behaviours. “The new strategy [of prevention] 
had to eschew all the trappings of coercion and threats to privacy if the epidemic was not to be driven 
underground” (Kirp and Bayer, 1992, p. 365). 
This article sets out to examine the implementation and the evolution of a public policy of AIDS 
prevention in France through campaigns targeting the general population. More precisely, its purpose 
is to make understandable the way the political authorities dealt with the emergence of an epidemic 
through mass media campaigns warning the general public about risks related to the HIV epidemic. 
Conflict and drama give salience to a specific problem among many other possible issues in a “highly 
selective process” (Blumer, 1971: 302) characterizing political action. They are fuelled by the action 
of resolute groups which put pressure on politicians (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988).  
Political action is the result of the interplay of a number of actors in different arenas. However, some 
actors appear to be more prominent than others in a specific context. I argue that the gay activist 
organizations have taken the lead in placing AIDS prevention at the forefront of the political agenda 
and have imposed their framing (Benford and Snow, 2000), at a cognitive as well as at a symbolic and 
emotional level. All the other actors, including the politicians, had to determine their perceptions, their 
goals and their modes of intervention in reference to those key actors. Because of the intensity of 
public debates, the commitment of activist organizations, and the questioning of the authorities —as 
well as of medical and scientific dominance (Epstein, 1996; Barbot, 2002; Dodier, 2003)—, AIDS 
became a political problem of prime importance.  
Next, I argue that in France the activist organizations took advantage of a situation of political 
weakness due to two factors: the outset of periods of political “cohabitation” from 1987 and, from the 
end of the 80s, the HIV-tainted blood scandal. Without any doubt, the negligence shown in the mid-
1980s in that scandal—a lack of vigilance, an underestimation of risks, and a focus on economic 
interests—discredited the authorities. The contaminated blood lawsuit, which started in 1989, was of 
major importance in France (Steffen, 1999). It generated a strong public controversy and suggested the 
inadequacy of the political treatment of a public health problem (Marmor, Dillon and Scher, 1999). 
Since then, the authorities have been very sensitive to the AIDS issue and willing to show their 
commitment. The scandal reinforced the rhetoric of the activists about political and economic 
cynicism (Kirp, 1999). The situation of political weakness was reinforced by a second factor. From 
1986 to 2002, since there was a gap between the time schedule of presidential and parliament 
elections, and as the prime minister and the government are chosen among the majority of the 
                                                
1  For  the U.K., see Berridge, 1996, and for the U.S.A, Levitt and Rosenthal, 1999. 
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dominant political party at the parliament2, France experienced several times a situation of political 
“cohabitation” as the government and the President belonged to opposite political trends, the left and 
the right wings, respectively. During this period, governments only lasted an average two years. So the 
political background was both uncertain and unstable. Therefore, the association of weakness, loss of 
credit, uncertainty and instability gave an unique opportunity to AIDS activist groups to take a leading 
position among the actors associated to the political decisions. They were able to conquer that position 
because of pre-existing networks and pressure groups and also because of new opportunities. 
Methods 
Two kinds of data were used in this research: archives, and testimonies collected through interviews. 
The archives of the CFES (French Committee of Health Education), of the AFLS (French Agency to 
Combat AIDS, in charge of AIDS prevention from 1989 to 1993) and of the Department of Health 
were processed. They consisted of numerous and diversified documents containing strategic guidelines 
and documents produced in the framework of the 25 national prevention campaigns between 1987 and 
1996: briefings given to the advertising agencies, surveys, pre- and post-tests, accounts of meetings on 
the preparation of campaigns, the press releases given during the presentation of campaigns, the 
creations themselves: radio or TV spots, posters, press advertisements; documents on the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of campaigns, press articles about campaigns, and mail exchanges about campaigns 
or communication strategies.  
Testimonies were collected through interviews after the analysis of the archives. Fifty-four persons 
directly involved in the realization of AIDS communication campaigns during these ten years were 
interviewed. Four persons were interviewed twice.  
Our respondents were selected because of their special status within the institutions, organizations and 
firms to which they belonged. They all had a key role in the implementation of AIDS public 
communication. The political personnel were cabinet ministers’ advisers or senior officials; the 
experts consulted for the preparation of the campaigns were epidemiologists or social scientists, 
members of advertising agencies or of organizations. Each respondent was interviewed in so far as he 
or she represented a particular function or testified on a specific period. These are the two axes — 
institutional and chronological — on which the interview analysis was based.  
 
Actors and arenas in the policy-making process 
Political action results from the conjunction of actors, institutions and a specific context determining 
the possible conditions and constraints allowing it to develop (Kingdon, 1984; Hilgartner and Bosk, 
1988). In the political arena, an inner circle, comprising the core executive (the President and the 
Government), the ministerial cabinets, the political institutions and the administration can be 
distinguished from an outer circle, including the media, experts, social movement organizations, 
institutions, advertising agencies, and the public.  
The inner circle : encroachments and conflicts 
In a country with a centralized political system like France, the centre of decision and action is the 
government— particularly the minister of health in the case of AIDS— and its political appointees3. 
During the last decades, because of elections and cabinet-reshuffles, the temporal horizon of the 
ministers of health has been very limited: an average two year duration, a short one when long-term 
policies are at stake. Indeed, ministers were both restricted by the necessity of meeting their 
electorate's requirements and pushed by an audacity due to an actual commitment and concern for 
public health issues. The importance of ministers’ cabinets significantly grew as cohabitation fostered 
                                                
2 In a situation of cohabitation, the French President has more of a symbolic role, except for the foreign affairs. 
The Prime minister always has the governing role : he/she chooses the ministers, appoints his/her cabinet 
without the oversight of the President and sets the politics with his/her appointees. 
3 The role of the parliament and of the senate has been rather limited, since the executive power 
essentially relied on the existing laws or acted in edicts or decrees. 
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political uncertainty (Steffen, 1999). Ministers sought the support of personal advisers lacking the 
legitimacy of the polls or even of a former technical experience in health policy, whose mission was to 
deal with the administration and communication agencies. 
The administration — civil servants, career bureaucrats —closely interacts with executive power. That 
permanent structure evolves in relation to political will, through the creation of new departments 
encroaching on the territory of the former ones, bringing about a lasting conflicting situation. The duty 
of  the administration is to serve politicians by preparing files and by advising decisions and actions. 
In France, since the turnover of political staff was high, civil servants were more familiar with the 
issues. Furthermore, they had their own framing and tried to initiate the new ministers to it, although 
the latter took up their function with their own framing and tried to impose it on sometimes reluctant 
civil servants. They were thus involved in never-ending negotiations, even conflicts. For example, in 
1989, the creation by the Minister of health  Mr. Claude Évin of a structure exclusively dedicated to 
AIDS prevention, the French Agency in the Fight against AIDS4 (AFLS), and the latter’s evolution, 
provide a good example of the complexity of the relationships between ad hoc political structures and 
the administration. “We had a way of working that was completely different from the administration’s. 
There was no such thing as the usual hierarchy... The aim was to lighten the hierarchical structures to 
be able to make swift decisions about the epidemic”, commented one member of AFLS. Reluctant to 
see health education dismantled and their mission encroached, the members of the previous ministerial 
structures — the General Board of Health (DGS) and the French Committee for Health Education 
(CFES) — protested against the new structure. Likely, being part of the new structure was also 
uncomfortable. The conflict between the AFLS and the services of the ministry of health lasted all 
along its short existence, ending in 1993. It was dissolved because of the overlapping of its mission 
with the DGS and because of political comeback of a conservative government, hostile to an agency 
set up by a socialist government. 
AIDS prevention has been conceived as a special topic in which administrative routine could not 
prevail. It was viewed as a war, a permanent combat, a race against time, and a struggle against death. 
It was none of the business of civil servants locked in their petty ambitions and their professional 
logic. Hence the agitation, the feeling of constant urgency, as testified by the following senior officer 
in the Minister of Health: “I keep the impression of having taken part in a war, to have been all the 
time on the front... I believe we were feeling guilty…We saw people die. I never attended so many 
funerals as in that period. That’s why we were so militant”.  
The outer circle: the struggle for legitimate expertise 
In the outer circle we will focus here on the activist organizations, leaving the experts, the press and 
the media in the background. Politicians call on experts to investigate a problem and enlighten their 
decisions. They also call on forces acting on public opinion, although the latter usually acts on its own 
initiative to exert a pressure on political action, to orient it towards their points of view. The activist 
organizations benefited from their social capital, especially their proximity to the political world and 
to the medias. In the case of AIDS, the monopoly of expertise was partly taken away by those who 
knew — the scientists. And those who, in other circumstances, would have had the status of witnesses, 
of victims arousing emotion or compassion—the member of activist organizations— became those 
who had access to a deep, intimate, true and unique knowledge. Expertise was gained through what 
was lived and felt (Pollak, 1993).  
The authorities have recourse to expertise to take the most appropriate decisions, but problems emerge 
when they are faced with contradictory expertise, which renders more difficult the decision-making 
process. Furthermore, expertise sometimes increases uncertainty. Therefore, the authorities have been 
distrustful of scientists lost in controversies, in so subtle conflicts that they were impossible to grasp. 
They also distrusted scientists unwilling to learn anything about the requirements of political 
management. 
                                                
4 I follow the translation of the administrative bodies found in Steffen (1996). 
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The framing process 
 
The first phase of political involvement was the initiation of action —including the first mass-media 
campaign in 1987— at a time when the dominant framing was the fight against panic and 
stigmatisation. During the second phase (1989-1993), a twofold strategy was defined and the issue 
expanded significantly. Its main purpose was to fight stigmatisation by creating a single target for 
national prevention campaigns: people who have sex, whatever their sexual orientation or trajectory, 
and who must use condoms. Thus a specific issue was redefined as a more general one. Obviously, the 
first campaign of testimonies in 1989 was designed to combat discrimination and to arouse a symbolic 
mobilization. During the third phase (1995-1997), the diversity of sexual orientations and risks was 
thoroughly tackled. The gay side of AIDS was shown without prejudice or shame. The AIDS activists 
thus reached a central political objective: promoting a better acceptance of the gay community 5. 
The  implementation of a political line results from a framing based on a specific analysis of the 
situation, from the point of view of scientific knowledge and of public opinion. Thereafter political 
action could be considered as the “practice of normal politics” (to paraphrase an expression that Kuhn 
(1962) uses in the framework of sociology of science), therefore the routine keeping of the same 
paradigm. Even if external pressures do not ease, the line of action is rigidified, which can turn into 
routine and even sclerosis.  
Blaming and framing   
The activist organizations have been involved in two intertwined processes: blaming and framing. 
Because these two processes are closely linked, framing cannot only be considered as a cognitive and 
rational process but as a symbolic and emotional process as well (Benford and Snow, 2000; Hilgartner 
and Bosk, 1988). Blaming is essential to foster “conflict expansion” (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976). In 
all the Western countries, the organizations have developed a rhetoric of blaming. But, from 1989, 
there was in France as a widely shared feeling of anger about the HIV-tainted blood scandal reinforced 
the blame (Steffen, 1999). The policy makers and the medical doctors, i.e. the “natural experts” when 
health is at stake lost their credibility. Thus eliminating competition, the activists were given the 
opportunity to take the lead of the framing of the issue.  
To get more people implied, the issue had then to be generalized and laden with emotions, symbols 
and values (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976). Activist groups are likely to draw more attention to specific 
issues by creating an impression that these issues are of concern for a large segment of the public and 
by fostering a movement of moral protest (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992; Dodier, 2003). 
Facing the dilemmas of communication 
As they get involved in action, politicians have to rely on elements of understanding and framing of 
the situation and to communicate them to the public. They then face the dilemma of telling or 
concealing the truth. Should the  seriousness of AIDS be hidden or not? For instance, during the TV 
spot of the first French national prevention campaign, an off-voice stated: ”AIDS is not an epidemic, 
it’s an illness one can avoid”. Defining AIDS as an epidemic could have resulted in panic and 
stigmatisation, hence the refusal to conceive of AIDS in terms of a catastrophe out of control i.e. as an 
epidemic. 
The process of expansion of AIDS issue was a contradictory one. The disease concerned specific 
groups. However, in order to generalize the issue, AIDS was considered as an illness “which regards 
everyone”. But at the same time, it mattered to contain panic reactions in the general population. For 
the AIDS activists, this statement was a way of generalizing the issue. At the same time, as they 
pointed out its inaccuracy, it allowed them to question the authorities. From the point of view of 
communication, a twofold dilemma resulted from this framing: downplaying or dramatizing the issue 
(Robins and Backstrom, 1991), focusing prevention messages to the general population or to specific 
                                                
5 On the fringes of the AIDS issue, the law implementing the PACS, a form of institutional union between two 
persons whatever their gender, was passed in 1999. This law, supported by gay organizations, was a social 
recognition of homosexual union.  
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groups more at risk, a well-known “prevention paradox” (Davison, Smith and Frankel, 1991). If the 
two dilemmas are combined, the result is in all the cases the increase in infection risk and an 
inappropriate prevention (Table 1), for different reasons: whether the people hide their risk status or 
they think not to be at risk at all. And as a consequence the authorities’ credibility decreases. 
 
 
                      Issue treatment 
Targets 
Dramatizing/exaggerating Downplaying 
Whole population Panic or disbelief Loss of interest, indifference 
Specific groups at risk Fear of stigmatization Dilution of responsibility 
Table 1: The dilemmas of communication and their consequences for the target groups  
From this twofold paradox, one can easily understand what a sensitive task for the authorities 
communicating is, especially when activists are always emphasizing the contradictions they are facing. 
But the task is not less tricky for the activists: when their frame of reference was largely adopted and 
when their modes of action pervaded all the actors, they were threatened to loose their visibility, 
therefore induced to outbidding tactics endangering their credibility. 
Noteworthy stages of AIDS public communication 
The agenda-setting of AIDS resulted from mobilizations, collective actions, and the commitment of 
the activist groups and of the media. No other health problem had previously generated similar levels 
of mobilization among the citizens of France and their representatives. When the authorities commit 
themselves in a health problem, they prove their will to set it on their agenda and to underline its 
significance for society as a whole. That is in itself a way of alerting the public. Reciprocally, the 
involvement of the public in a health problem induces the politicians to deal with it. The strategy of 
HIV/AIDS communication have been focused on two main objectives: prevention of the spreading of 
the disease through the use of condoms, and from 1989 onwards, prevention of the stigmatisation of 
people with AIDS, what Mann and Carballo (1988) called the “third epidemic”.  
The implementation of AIDS prevention must be analysed in a chronological perspective since the 
social actors and the institutional dynamics changed over time — as did the prime ministers and the 
ministers of health between 1987 and 1996 because of elections and reshuffles. In a context of 
personal conflicts and institutional encroachments, emergency and emotional load caused burnouts. 
The illness struck the spokespersons and the motivation for activism gradually decreased (Fillieule and 
Broqua, 2000). The balance of power shifted as the political influence of the voluntary sector 
decreased after the mid-1990s.  
The first national prevention campaign was broadcast on television in April 1987. Thereafter 
campaigns were programmed regularly, with a periodicity of two or three annually and with large 
budgets compared to the other health education programs. After the introduction in 1996 of new and 
efficient therapeutic combinations, and in a period of normalization of AIDS after fifteen odd years of 
sustained attention, the campaigns' frequency decreased significantly, as did the pressure of AIDS 
organizations. Our analysis stops when this backlash started.  
The institutions in charge of the achievement of campaigns changed over time. From 1987 to 1989, the 
authorities entrusted the campaigns to the institution in charge of health education, the French 
Committee for Health Education (CFES). In 1989, in order to emphasize the importance of AIDS 
prevention, a special structure was created6, the French Agency in the Fight against AIDS (AFLS). 
This body was dissolved in 1994 and the ministry of health — the ministerial cabinet as well as its 
technical services (AIDS Division of the General Board of Health) — took over AIDS prevention 
policy, with the assistance of the CFES for realization. The creation of the campaign material itself has 
always been delegated to private advertising agencies, like all governmental communication.  
                                                
6 A similar move is observed in Great Britain (Berridge, 1996). 
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Three significant stages of AIDS public communication will be presented. Each bears the mark of 
activist groups. At the stage of initiation, in 1987, the first strategy had a limited objective: drawing 
the attention of the general public and preventing irrational reactions and stigmatisation. In 1989, the 
first campaign on solidarity marked the implementation of an actual strategy emphasizing the 
importance of empathy with the PWAs, beside the promotion of condoms like everyday usual objects 
without linking their use to AIDS. A realistic and daring strategy was designed after 1994 : its aim was 
to present overtly all the aspects of sexual risk, including homosexual practices. 
In search of a strategy 
In 1986, France was treated to a political innovation: the right wing won the parliament elections and 
the socialist president, François Mitterrand, had to choose a prime minister in the conservative 
majority party. Jacques Chirac became the head of the first so-called “cohabitation” government. The 
CFES personnel, under suspicion of being too much in favour of the left wing, was pushed into the 
background. Because of the lack of trust between the government and the President, the first national 
advertising campaign was prepared secretly by a small team placed under the direct supervision of the 
minister of health, Michèle Barzach. She had to fear her leftist political opponents as well as her 
conservative allies. Despite the uncertain political context, Barzach took important decisions against 
the spread of AIDS. "She did not hesitate too long. It took her six months. A left-wing government did 
not do it, fearing the political risk ", testifies an epidemiological expert. The incidence of HIV/AIDS 
was increasing in France. The growing awareness of the extent of the epidemic in Africa led to fears 
of a dramatic increase in transmission by heterosexual contact. Therefore, the public needed to be 
informed to protect themselves and to prevent panic reactions.  
Barzach secretly prepared a campaign with a small team hired for that purpose. It is noticeable that 
from the very start, the members of the administration sought the collaboration of the members of 
activist organizations. The member of the CFES in charge of the first campaign in 1987 was 
convinced by their rhetoric. “I met key persons in the process of AIDS construction… And I realized 
that this disease had a very special connotation. They deeply touched me by their new discourse of 
solidarity, of social mobilization”  
Advice was sought from the gay activist organizations, which already had experience with prevention. 
They were consulted for the implementation of an action directed to the general public, especially to 
design leaflets intended for broad distribution. The pressure from organizations was growing and, as 
their social capital allowed them to have access to the media, they had strong communication power. 
Referring to the organizations was a political as well as a technical gesture because they had been 
involved in preventive actions since 1984 and that was conceived as a way to avoid hostile reactions. 
"Their role was increasing. That's because we wanted them to be involved. Better to have them with us 
than against us" said the doctor in charge of that campaign in the CFES. 
The minister’s cabinet chose the advertising agency and wrote a few strategic recommendations. "I 
remember the brief we had, it said: people have to be aware of their responsibilities, to be induced to 
protect themselves but without saying how. We were not allowed to promote condoms" said the 
director of the advertising agency. 
In April 1987 the campaign "AIDS will not get through me" was broadcast on television. The film 
showed a man or a woman breaking an increasing curve supposed to illustrate the spread of the 
epidemic. Its purpose was to raise awareness of the illness. However, no clear indication was given 
about ways to prevent it, as its advertising designer noted with regret. "During the presentation of the 
campaign, at the end, when that increasing curve was shown, a leaflet should have followed. A 
leaflet… was meant to be distributed everywhere to say how to protect oneself from AIDS… But there 
was no leaflet. ... So the campaign remained a thing telling people: ‘if you don't behave like bloody 
idiots, you won't catch it’ but without saying how". Therefore that campaign was severely criticized.  
Launching a campaign perceived and criticized as distant from reality, Barzach nonetheless initiated 
the first national advertising campaign, taking into account the constraints of expression at that time. 
She put the problem of AIDS on the political agenda, avoiding thorny issues—homosexuality and 
immigration — which were then difficult to address publicly through the mass media.  
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The promotion of  proximity to PWAs: sharing emotions and compassion  
The twofold communication strategy defined in 1989 lasted throughout the AFLS' existence. It was 
based on two main principles, both intended to combat discrimination and to give a broader extent to 
the AIDS issue. This way of framing AIDS public communication is significantly influenced by the 
positions of the most important French AIDS organization, Aides, advocating for the extension of the 
AIDS issue (J. Barbot, 2000).  
The strategy stated to communicate on condoms without referring to HIV infection, as “the explicit 
association of condoms and AIDS in the advertising campaigns could induce people to perceive 
condoms as a medicine against a very serious illness” 7. Condoms should become a “habitual element 
of sexual intercourse”. They were to appear as “everyday consumer objects”, used by everyone in 
every circumstance. Thus the question of prevention for PWAs was not treated separately, for the idea 
was that everyone should protect himself or herself rather than trying to protect others.  
Besides communication on solidarity was implemented. It was meant to prevent the stigmatization of 
exposed groups. It was stated that these groups would accept the prevention messages only if they 
were addressed to the whole population in a climate of solidarity. Those messages had two objectives: 
“creating a motivating and positive climate for the adoption of individual prevention behaviours” and 
fostering “cultural and social agreement on prevention, and solidarity with the victims of the illness”. 
With the first national campaign of testimonies —"AIDS: everyone can come across it"— organized 
by the newly-created French Agency in the Fight against AIDS (AFLS), a new way of communicating 
about AIDS, besides condom promotion, became a reality. Its purpose was to provide visibility to the 
illness by showing PWAs in order to make them closer to the public. A message of solidarity and 
emotional communication emerged, with strong emotions tied to mourning PWAs or sharing space 
with them. Putting the emotional dimension at the foreground reflected the stance of activist 
organizations. It also signalled how much the AFLS members were dedicated to their work. They were 
willing to perceive themselves as militants, like the few members of activist groups who have been 
hired by AFLS. Through emotion and compassion, the AFLS’ staff and the members of the 
advertising agency took part in an involvement process. Furthermore, by the late 80s, activists were 
hired in the administration. Even though their position between the world of Administration and the 
world of activist organizations was very uncomfortable at times, these activists played a crucial role as 
bridges of communication.  
The first solidarity campaign based on that strategy will be the only one presented in this article. Its 
brief insisted on the importance of the feeling of proximity to the illness, both to make people feel 
more secure about an alarming situation, as the number of PWAs was increasing continuously, and to 
improve risk perception and prevention. It was important to arouse an "identification process with 
PWAs through testimonies". Promoting solidarity and proximity was equivalent to promoting 
prevention. “The closer one is to sick people, the better one protects oneself. It was important to create 
that proximity link, and the best way to create it was the testimony", explained one of the advertising 
designers.  By increasing the visibility of the illness the actors of prevention wished to demonstrate 
that AIDS concerned everybody even if the statistics showed that it was concentrated in specific 
groups — mostly gays and intravenous drug users at that time.  
As one may surmise, the activists influenced the implementation of those campaigns, their emotional 
tone and the content of their messages. Some of them helped to find witnesses. But collaboration with 
the AFLS was far from easy, not only because of disagreements on the strategy, i.e. on the translation 
of framing into action, but also because of the difficulty the militants had in sharing their grief and 
mourning. Wanting to involve PWAs in the communication process, the AFLS decided to make the 
films with real PWAs, although the film director first hired actors, and the pre-tests shown that 
testimonies played by actors had more impact. Nonetheless, the activists stressed the superiority of the 
real experience of illness. With that choice, the AFLS gave up the idea of putting across information 
on the illness and on prevention, as actors narrating a text would have done. In the real testimonies, 
only one TV spot clearly gave a prevention message on syringe sharing; all the others stressed the 
support by relatives and friends. The testimonies of this first solidarity campaign put forward a 
narrative of exemplary management of the disease: people who struggle, show a strong will to live, 
                                                
7  Agence Française de Lutte contre le Sida : “ La communication publique sur le sida : Premier document 
d’orientation ”. Not dated.  
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have a good relationship with their doctors, live serenely with the HIV infection, and keep up their 
hopes, among understanding and supportive relatives.   
These campaigns started a dynamics: they significantly contributed to the promotion of a vision of the 
illness that made it both closer and more common. Yet, in the final analysis, these campaigns denied 
reality. As long as they had no symptoms, the PWAs were able to live "like everybody" else. But when 
the opportunistic infections started, the reality was less idyllic and it was far more difficult to show the 
deterioration of health on TV screens. The critical reactions of the activist organizations are therefore 
understandable. From their point of view, campaigns threatened to blur the dramatic character of the 
illness and accordingly to induce a drop in the attention and involvement of the public (Hilgertner and 
Bosk, 1988). 
That first solidarity campaign, like those that followed on a regular basis, stressed the importance of 
fostering a favourable emotional climate. Public communication could efficiently reach this objective. 
It also showed the increasing influence of the activist groups, despite their reluctance to take part in 
actions initiated by the authorities and their will to keep a critical distance. As Cobb, Ross and Ross 
(1976) stated, “the dilemma for the group which originally initiates the issue is that while expansion is 
crucial for success, it may lead to loosing control of the issue entirely as more powerful groups enter 
the conflict and the original participants grow less important” (p. 128). 
 1994-5: more daring strategy 
The year 1993 was marked a return to “cohabition”, and an institutional change. By dissolving the 
AFLS, the ministry of health recovered a full control on AIDS policy. The findings of social sciences 
research funded by the National Agency of Research on AIDS (ANRS), created in 1989, allowed the 
implementation of a new strategy for public communication. In brief, that strategy stated that 
HIV/AIDS prevention should be addressed through a focus on "risk situations" (Bajos et al., 1994) 
that are the same whatever the sexual orientation. Every instance of unprotected sexual intercourse 
with a person of unknown serological status and every shared syringe can be considered as risky. The 
purpose was then to tackle the diversity of risk situations through a clear and forthright language, 
dealing with all sorts of multi-partnership — heterosexual, bisexual, homosexual —, with diverse 
sexual practices —vaginal, anal and oral— and with all means of protection —condoms, whether 
lubricated or not, with or without additional water-based gels. The aim was no longer to promote 
condoms like any other consumer object, but to promote means of protection against HIV in every 
circumstance. At the same time, communication on proximity with PWAs was maintained with the 
same emotional tone. From this point of view, there was a continuity of communication that proved its 
efficacy and utility by maintaining a good climate of tolerance8. 
Among the numerous actors called upon by the authorities, researchers in epidemiology and social 
science were involved in the conception of public communication, as were activist organizations, 
especially the most activist of them, Act Up-Paris, created in 1989 (Barbot, 2002). For a long time, the 
organizations had been very critical about the campaigns, accusing them of being allusive and prudish, 
and therefore of missing two realities of HIV/AIDS: its links with the diversity of sexual orientations 
and practices, especially homosexuality, and the seriousness of the disease, the difficult life of a PWA. 
It was thought that addressing homosexuality directly would lower stigmatisation. It should have a 
preventive effect and allow PWAs to involve themselves in preventive behaviours, as they would be 
less tempted to hide both their homosexuality and their illness. In the mid-1990s, the authorities as 
well as the researchers, the members of advertising agencies and the activists were convinced that 
public communication had to get rid of prudishness and to adopt a daring and forthright tone. That was 
done in the national advertising campaign of the summer 1995. That campaign was outstanding 
because of its daring, its scope and its political and media repercussions.  
It was prepared in a context of political unbalance by two ministers involved in the combat against 
HIV/AIDS, both politically and personally. Since 1993, the government had decided to make the 
epidemic "a public health priority". Sufficient means were put at the disposal of the struggle against 
HIV/AIDS, in terms of funding, institutions and manpower. The preparation of the campaign took 
place before the presidential elections. The ballot was in to take place in May 1995 and the incumbent 
government knew that it would not stay in power since Jacques Chirac's victory was foreseeable. It 
                                                
8 Observatoire Régional de Santé de l’Ile-de-France. 2001. 
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was partly for that reason, and also because of their convictions, that members of that government did 
not hesitate to get involved in the preparation of a very daring campaign, knowing that they would not 
have to bear its consequences. Once the new government was formed and had become familiar with 
the files, the campaign was ready, the advertising spaces had been bought and it was too late to 
backtrack. 
The campaign consisted in a set of press advertisements published in different newspapers and 
magazines with extensive media coverage. The 13 advertisements had the same style: a catch phrase, a 
relatively long text, a picture and a slogan: "protect yourself from AIDS". Three of them were about 
homosexual, bisexual, and heterosexual multi-partnerships. An example of the catch phrase was: "if 
you make love with Peter, think of protecting John9”. The texts dealt with condom use, lubricated or 
not, with or without water-based gel, with regard to diverse sexual practices, oral, vaginal, and anal. 
Two advertisements shown a couple (a man and woman or two men) having breakfast. For the Gay 
couple, the text said: "Patrick and Christopher live together. They made love an hour ago. As they 
sometimes have other affairs, they protect themselves”. With regard to sexual practices the text 
recommended the use of both condom and water-based gel for penetration and the use of non-
lubricated condom for fellatio. It also mentioned the possibility of practicing oral sex without a 
condom if "one is careful never to get sperm in the mouth". Finally, an advertisement targeting 
injected drug users recommended the use of both sterile syringes and condoms. All the advertisements 
were pre-tested following the usual procedure and got positive reactions. 
A part of the new government to the advertisements was shocked  and the prime minister's arbitration 
was required against the will of the minister of health, favourable to the campaign. However, only a 
few changes were decided during a crisis meeting, shortly before the launching of the campaign. A 
few pictures, perceived as too provocative10, were changed and some texts were slightly amended. In 
fact those changes were only marginal ones, due to opposition from the advertising agency and the 
administration members who had prepared the campaign. Only one advertisement recommending  
condom use during oral sex was cancelled as epidemiologists argued that the risk of oral transmission 
was only theoretical. These changes, especially the latter triggered the Act Up-Paris militants' wrath. 
During the press conference presenting the campaign, they violently protested, accusing the authorities 
of criminal negligence and of censorship. That protest gave the campaign an unprecedented media 
impact. The press, experts, advertising agency, authorities, and even the activists, agreed on the daring 
of the campaign. "We had the impression of having a huge impact, of being efficient. Because of these 
changes, we managed to combine efficacy and acceptability. Furthermore, because the press talked 
about the changes, they talked about the campaign much more than if nothing had happened", said a 
CFES member. "We did our usual thing. We pulled it off: the journalists talked only of the cancelled 
posters of the risk of oral-genital transmission. Indirectly, by questioning what did not exist, we 
allowed the messages to get through. It has been the most complete and striking campaign ever done”, 
according to an Act Up-Paris' activist.  
Two conflicting dimensions of that campaign are important if we are to understand the dynamics of 
the political agenda: (1) the uncertainty of the scientific expertise, with the attendant difficulty to 
decide on action based on it; and (2) the impact of the activist organizations when they are resolved, 
unyielding, and when they have connections with the media and the actors taking part in the political 
action.  
(1) The question of HIV/AIDS transmission by oral sex is characterized by scientific uncertainty, a so-
called "theoretical risk”. The activist organizations took advantage of this uncertainty to build up and 
impose their certainties. Some of them recommended the use of condoms during oral sex. The activist 
organizations took the lead with regard to relevance and legitimacy of expertise.  
(2) Close to the advertising agency, Act Up-Paris influenced it, extending in this way its influence in 
that arena. That activist organization also put pressure on the administration and on the cabinet of the 
minister of health, and had access to the media. Its stance was both provocative and resolute as it 
overtly defended the interests of PWAs and a better acceptance of homosexuality. For that campaign it 
adopted a strategy of lobbying by controlling all the nerve centres of state-run communication. The 
Act Up-Paris' vigilance and constant pressures contributed to save almost the whole of the campaign. 
                                                
9 The first names have been changed. 
10 For example the one with two men in the same bed, or three others with bare feet in a bed. 
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It strove to get the politicians out of their function of morally neutral arbiters, whose prime objective 
was to defend public causes, hence public health. But it reached its political goal at the expense of its 
credibility. It reached at the same time the paroxysm of its influence and a point where that influence 
could only decrease. 
Conclusion 
In France, a continuous and sufficiently funded communication about AIDS risk have been devised. 
Therefore, politicians had to address thorny aspects of sexuality dealing with private and intimate 
problems and despite their reluctance to do so, to get involved in actions condemned by a part of the 
general public and by influential institutions such as the religious authorities. 
The three stages of state-run communication presented here relate the developments of the political 
action through a growing number of actors and the involvement of institutions and illustrate the 
translation of framing into action through successive strategies. During the first stage, as the activists 
were stressing the lack of political intervention, the authorities’ intervention was required to prevent 
the spread of the epidemic. The public communication was initiated outside the existing structures, 
accused of too much routine, with the minister of health's personal commitment but with no clear 
recommendation addressed to the public. During the second stage, a new institution dealing 
exclusively with AIDS prevention was implemented. and a actual strategy was designed. It 
emphasized proximity to PWAs, in addition to sexual protection by condom use. At that stage, the 
purpose was to foster an emotional atmosphere of compassion and solidarity. This psychological 
conditioning was important for the implementation and reception of the political action. The third 
stage illustrates an important aspect of the development of political action. The authorities were caught 
in a pincer movement between organizations with militant methods that used the media as a powerful 
mouthpiece, and uncertain, questioned, scientific expertise difficult to translate into action. Political 
action was also problematical because more and more actors were getting involved at that stage, which 
meant that different conceptions and contradictory interests were at play. Paradoxically, the 
proliferation of actors, and consequently of objectives, significantly emphasized daring. Since the 
studied period ended in 1997, we did not consider an important and still ongoing aspect of the AIDS 
policy: the decrease of political and public commitment.  
Political action and its evolution have resulted in a conflicting situation fostered by the activist 
organizations. One can say that the gay activists reached their goal even if they were not totally 
satisfied with the outcome— this being a way of keeping their activist identity. “Agreement that an 
issue merits serious consideration does not imply that the outcome of this conflict will correspond to 
the goal of the issue’s proponents” (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976: 126).  
In France, activist groups benefited from the authorities’ guilt because of the scandal of HIV-tainted 
blood; from their deep criticism against the Authorities, accused of being unable of implementing any 
efficient prevention policy and of being too prudish; from their influence on the media and on the 
political world; from a unstable political context and from the agreement of almost all the other actors. 
All these factors explain why they succeeded in politicising the issue beyond any expectation. But the 
paradox remains that the activists lost their credibility and their visibility when they were able to exert 
a strong influence. 
Bibliographical references  
Adam, P.(1999). Expérience intime et action collective. Sexualité, maladie et lutte contre le sida. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Paris : EHESS. 
Bajos,  N., Lert, F., Bastard, B., Ben Slama, F., Calvez, M., Giraud, M., Paicheler, G., Schiltz, M.A., 
Souteyrand, Y., Spira, A. & Vincenzi, I. de, (1994). Contribution de la recherche en sciences 
sociales et en santé publique à la définition des stratégies de communication sur la prévention de la 
transmission sexuelle du VIH. ANRS Information 12, 31-36. 
Barbot, J. (2002). Les malades en mouvements. La médecine et la science à l’épreuve du sida. Paris: 
Balland. 
Bayer, R. & Kirp, D.L. (1992). The US : At the Center of the Storm, In Kirp, D. L. & Bayer, R. (Eds), 
AIDS in the Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics and Policies. (pp.7-48). New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.  
 12 
Benford, R. & Snow, D. (2000). Framing processes and social movements : an overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26, 611-639. 
Berridge, V. (1996). AIDS in the UK : The making of a policy. Oxford. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Blumer, H. (1971). Social problems as collective behavior. Social Problems 18: 298-306. 
Cobb, R.W., Ross, J.-K. & Ross, M.H. (1976). Agenda building as a comparative political process, 
American Political Science Review 70, 126-138. 
Davison, C., Smith, C.D. & Frankel, S. (1991). Lay epidemiology and the prevention paradox : the 
implications of coronary candidacy for health education. Sociology of Health and Illness 13, 1-19. 
Dodier, N. (2003). Leçons politiques de l’épidémie de sida. Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS. 
Epstein, S. (1996). Impure Science. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Feldman, E. A. and Bayer, R. (1999). Blood Feuds : AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical 
Disaster. Oxford, New York: Oxford university Press. 
Fillieule, O. & Broqua, C. (2000). Les associations de lutte contre le sida : Approche des logiques de 
l’engagement à AIDES et à Act Up. Unpublished Report. 
Herzlich, C. & Pierret, J. (1989). The Construction of a Social Phenomenon : AIDS in the French 
Press. Social Science and Medicine 29, 11, 1235-1242.  
Hilgartner, S. & Bosk, C.L. (1988).. The Rise and Fall of Social Problems : A Public Arenas Model. 
American Journal of Sociology 94. 1. 53-78. 
Jasper, J.M. & Nelkin, D. (1992). The Animal Rights Crusade : The Growth of a Moral Protest. New 
York : The Free Press. 
Kingdon, J.W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. Boston : Little, Brown. 
Kirp, D. L. & Bayer, R. (Eds). (1992) AIDS in the Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics and 
Policies. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Kirp, D. (1999). The Politics of Blood: Hemophilia Activism in the AIDS Crisis. In Feldman, E. A. & 
Bayer, R. Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical Disaster (pp.293-32).. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions,  Chicago : The University of Chicago Press. 
Levitt, M; & Rosenthal, D.B. (1999). The third wave: A symposium on AIDS politics and policy in 
the United States in the 1990s. Policy Studies Journal 27 (4), 783-795. 
Mann, J.M. & Carballo, M. (1988). AIDS Social, cultural and political aspects : Overview. AIDS 3, : 
221-2213. 
Marmor, T.R., Dillon, P.A. & Scher, S. (1999). The Comparative Politics of Contaminated Blood: 
From Hesitancy to Scandal. In Feldman, E.A. & Bayer, R. (Eds), Blood Feuds : AIDS, Blood, and 
the Politics of Medical Disaster. (pp.349-366). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Observatoire Régional de Santé de l’Ile-de-France (2001). Les connaissances, attitudes, croyances et 
comportements face au VIH/sida en Ile-de-France. Évolution 1992-1994-1998-2001. December. 
Paicheler, G. (2002).  Prévention du sida et agenda politique : Les campagnes en direction du grand 
public (1987-1996). Paris : CNRS-Éditions. 
Pollak, M. (1993). Une identité blessée. Paris : Métaillié. 
Robins, L.S. & Backstrom, C.H. (1991). The New Politics of AIDS, In Littman, T.J.. & Robbins L.S. 
(Eds), Health Politics and Policy (pp.370-386). Albany, NY: Delman Publishers Inc. (2d Edition). 
Steffen, M. (1992). Social Solidarity and Scientific Expertise, In Kirp, D. L. and Bayer, R. (Eds) AIDS 
in the Industrialized Democracies: Passions, Politics and Policies (pp.221-251). New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press.  
Steffen, M. (1999). The Nation’s Blood: Medicine, Justice and  the State in France, In Feldman, E. A. 
& Bayer, R. (Eds), Blood Feuds : AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical Disaster (pp.95-126). 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
